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INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, Justin Layshock (“Justin”), a seventeen-year-old senior at 
Hickory High School in Hermitage, Pennsylvania, went onto his grand-
mother’s computer, at his grandmother’s home, and created a fictitious pro-
 
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law.  I would like to thank Professor 
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file on MySpace.com (“MySpace”1) of the principal of Hickory High 
School.2  The profile characterized the principal as a drug-using alcoholic.3  
Justin was suspended for ten days.4  Similarly, in 2007, J.S., a fourteen-
year-old eighth grade student at Blue Mountain Middle School in Orwigs-
burg, Pennsylvania, logged onto her household computer and created a fic-
titious MySpace profile of her principal.5  This profile characterized the 
principal as a bisexual sex addict.6  J.S. was suspended for ten days.7  Both 
students brought cases against their school districts.  While the facts of both 
cases are almost identical, the Third Circuit issued opposite holdings, one 
in favor of the student and the other in favor of the school district.8 
This intra-circuit split is likely due to a lack of guidance from the United 
States Supreme Court on the issue of when school officials may punish 
students for Internet speech created on a student’s home computer.  The 
standard utilized in most student speech cases was established in Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District,9 a case decided in 
1969, prior to the invention of the Internet.  In Tinker, a group of students 
sued their school district after being suspended for wearing black armbands 
in protest of the Vietnam War.10  The Supreme Court held that “where 
there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct 
would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of ap-
propriate discipline in the operation of the school,’ the prohibition cannot 
be sustained.”11  In dicta, the Court further stated that a school may be able 
to punish student speech if, in the absence of a substantial disruption, the 
record demonstrates “any facts which might reasonably have led school au-
thorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with 
 
 1. MySpace is a popular social networking Internet site where users can share photos, 
music, personal interests, and the like with other Internet users. See MYSPACE, http://www. 
myspace.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2011). 
 2. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (W.D. Pa. 2007). 
 3. See id.  The profile stated that the principal was “too drunk to remember” the date of 
his birthday, and stated that the principal had smoked a “big blunt” in the past month. Id. 
 4. Id. at 593. 
 5. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2010), reh’g en 
banc granted No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. June 3, 2010). 
 6. See id. at 291. 
 7. See id. at 293. 
 8. Compare Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (in favor of student), with Snyder, 593 
F.3d at 308 (in favor of school district).  These cases were reheard en banc and a Third Cir-
cuit opinion is pending. 
 9. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 10. See id. 
 11. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
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school activities.”12  The standard established in Tinker is vague, in that 
courts are unclear as to when the test should apply and how much discre-
tion should be given to a school official’s decision to discipline.  In addi-
tion, having been established prior to Internet speech, the standard is out-
dated.  Courts are now left with the difficult task of applying the already 
murky Tinker standard to the modern context of the Internet.  More specifi-
cally, they must address this question: When does school discipline cross 
the line from merely punishing speech that the school disagrees with, to 
punishing speech that the school foresees would cause a substantial disrup-
tion to the school environment? 
The Internet is a unique communication device, creating a dilemma for 
both the schools and the district courts that adjudicate speech cases involv-
ing the Internet.  Unlike tangible forms of communication, such as newspa-
pers, speech made on the Internet is boundary-less,13 and pinpointing the 
location of its occurrence is not easily accomplished.  Therefore, when 
speech occurs via the Internet and concerns a school official, it is often dif-
ficult to determine an applicable standard.  In these cases, lower courts 
have struggled to apply the Tinker dicta. 
In the cases utilizing Tinker, most courts have broken the inquiry down 
into two prongs.  The first prong of the student speech inquiry asks whether 
the speech can be characterized as having occurred on or off campus.  Stu-
dent speech is afforded full First Amendment protection when it occurs off 
campus, but only limited First Amendment protection when it occurs on 
school grounds.14  Examples of off campus speech include a drawing done 
by a student in his home with no intention of bringing the drawing to 
school,15 and an underground newspaper sold off campus.16  If the speech 
is off campus, and is therefore afforded full First Amendment protection, 
punishment by the school district for such speech is prohibited.  If the 
speech is on campus, and therefore does not have complete First Amend-
ment protection, the analysis continues to the second prong.  The second 
prong of the student speech inquiry asks whether the on campus student 
speech has caused, or whether the school can reasonably forecast that it 
will cause, a substantial disruption to the school environment. 
 
 12. Id. at 514. 
 13. See Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 357 
(2003). 
 14. Benjamin F. Heidlage, A Relational Approach to Schools’ Regulation of Youth On-
line Speech, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 572, 573-74 (2009). 
 15. See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 611 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 16. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ.,  607 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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While the above analysis may work for tangible speech that does not 
take place over the Internet and, therefore, has a pinpointed location, for 
cases involving Internet speech, the analysis is akin to trying to fit a round 
peg into a square hole.  Traditionally, on campus speech included only 
speech that took place on school grounds during school hours.17  Therefore, 
some lower courts have mischaracterized the Internet speech issue as one 
of geography, and in determining whether the speech occurred on or off 
campus, have focused on whether the speech was made over the student’s 
computer, at the student’s home.18  Focusing on the location of the Internet 
speech is futile, given the distinct nature of online speech.19 
This Note proposes a new standard for student speech cases involving 
Internet speech.20  Due to the unique characteristics of the Internet, I sug-
gest eliminating the first prong of the analysis that asks whether the speech 
is on or off campus, and concentrating instead on the impact of the online 
speech.  The proposed standard would refine Tinker’s forecast of the sub-
stantial disruption test by incorporating the factors of whether the likelih-
ood of disruption is high and whether the type of disruption poses severe 
harm to the school environment.  This Note will focus on whether and 
when a school district may discipline a student for creating a parody profile 
of a school official on an off campus computer when the speech does not 
disrupt the school environment. 
Part I of this Note provides an historical summary of student speech and 
the First Amendment.  Part I.A discusses the history of the First Amend-
ment.  Part I.B discusses the Supreme Court cases involving student 
speech.  This Part provides a background for subsequent lower court deci-
sions.  Part II examines the current conflict in the lower courts and looks at 
how these courts have approached the issue of when schools may discipline 
speech where disruption did not result.  This Part will analyze the approach 
taken by courts in cases dealing with tangible, off campus speech, such as 
newspaper speech, and in cases dealing with Internet speech.  Part II.A ana-
lyzes non-Internet speech that does not have a substantial disruption on the 
school environment.  Part II.B analyzes cases concerning online student 
speech.  Part III argues that courts should shift their focus away from strict-
 
 17. Heidlage, supra note 14, at 573. 
 18. See id. at 574-75. 
 19. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 20. This Note focuses on how a court should analyze the issue of whether a school can 
reasonably forecast substantial disruption.  This issue is part of a larger debate as to whether 
student Internet speech conducted outside of school is afforded full First Amendment pro-
tection.  For purposes of this Note, cases with proven disruption are set aside, although the 
task of setting aside such cases is not always easy, because the issue of whether disruption is 
substantial enough to warrant school discipline remains at play. 
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ly applying the Tinker standard, and toward the adoption of a new rule that 
is more applicable to cases involving the Internet.  The new standard states 
that a school may punish a student for his or her speech only if the type of 
speech poses great harm to the school environment and the likelihood that 
such speech will result in substantial disruption is great.  This proposed test 
sets a higher bar for schools in their ability to punish student speech, and 
therefore avoids a chilling effect on students’ First Amendment right to free 
speech. 
I.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT, THE INTERNET, AND THE SUPREME 
COURT’S LIMITED JURISPRUDENCE ON STUDENT SPEECH 
A. The First Amendment 
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . ab-
ridging the freedom of speech.”21  The heart of this Amendment has been 
described as the “ineluctable relationship between the free flow of informa-
tion and a self-governing people.”22  Protection of free expression exists to 
encourage the free exchange and dissemination of ideas.23  The benefits so-
ciety reaps from the unrestricted flow of ideas outweigh the costs society 
endures by receiving deplorable ideas.  Generally, courts have zealously 
guarded the right to free speech. 
Nevertheless, this right is not absolute.  For example, certain types of 
speech can be regulated if they are likely to inflict unacceptable harm.  
These narrow categories of unprotected speech include “fighting words,”24 
speech that incites others to imminent lawless action,25 obscene speech,26 
defamatory speech,27 and “true threats.”28 
 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 22. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ.,  607 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 23. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (“Open debate and 
discussion of public issues are vital to our national health.  On public questions there should 
be ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 269-70 (1964). 
 24. See, e.g., Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942) (holding that 
speech directed at another that is likely to provoke violence is unprotected). 
 25. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[C]onstitutional guaran-
tees of free speech . . . do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of 
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (“This much has been categor-
ically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 283 (1964) (awarding damages for defama-
tion of public official if statement was made with actual malice). 
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B. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on Student Speech 
The Supreme Court has provided minimal guidance to lower courts re-
garding when a public school student’s First Amendment right to free 
speech prevails.29  The three decisions on this matter provide standards that 
cannot be properly applied to student online speech.30  Nonetheless, an in-
troduction to the Supreme Court precedent provides a useful backdrop to 
better understand the lower courts’ attempts to analyze the issue of whether 
student online speech may be disciplined by the school. 
In Tinker, a group of students in Des Moines, Iowa were suspended for 
wearing black arm bands to school to publicize their opposition to the 
Vietnam War.  The students brought an action against the school district for 
violation of the First Amendment.  In its majority opinion, the Supreme 
Court famously stated: “It can hardly be argued that either students or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression 
at the schoolhouse gate.”31  The Court held that prohibition of expression 
will not be justified where “there is no finding and no showing that engag-
ing in the forbidden conduct would ‘materially and substantially interfere 
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school.’”32  However, the Court limited the school’s right to discipline by 
stating that punishment must not be predicated merely on the desire “to 
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpo-
 
 28. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (stating that true threats are 
not constitutionally protected speech). 
 29. The First Amendment protects against prohibition of speech by government actors 
only. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985) (stating that in carrying out 
disciplinary functions, schools act as representatives of the State); see also W. Va. State Bd. 
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects citizens “against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of Education not 
excepted”). 
 30. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (holding a school may discipline a 
student when the student’s speech advocates illegal drug use); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding lewd and vulgar student speech is not protected 
by First Amendment); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 
(1969) (holding school district violated students’ First Amendment right to free speech 
when it suspended students for wearing black armbands to school in protest of Vietnam 
War).  A fourth case concerning student speech was decided by the Supreme Court.  How-
ever, the case is not relevant for purposes of this Note. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhl-
meier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).  Hazelwood concerned whether a school-sponsored newspaper 
was subject to a lower level of First Amendment protection. See id. at 262.  This Note is not 
concerned with non-Internet speech that is demonstrably on campus or school sponsored. 
 31. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 32. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
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pular viewpoint.”33  Instead, the prohibition must be based on “the special 
characteristics of the school environment.”34  The Court held that the stu-
dents’ black arm bands neither created, nor posed a risk of, substantial dis-
ruption to the school environment.35 
It is noteworthy that the Court referenced various factors that essentially 
define what constitutes a substantial disruption.  The Court considered the 
fact that the expression was unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance 
on the part of the students, the lack of evidence of petitioners’ interference 
with the school’s work, the fact that no class was interrupted, and the fact 
that no threats or acts of violence occurred on school grounds.36  Due to the 
absence of the above factors, the Court found a lack of evidence to support 
the prediction of substantial disruption or material interference with the 
school’s activities.37 
Tinker puts great emphasis on the special characteristics of a school.38  
While the Court did not limit its opinion to the confines of the classroom, 
the Tinker opinion deals only with on campus speech.  Because the 
school’s dedication to its students does not end once the student leaves the 
classroom, the Court reasoned that a student’s rights continue to apply 
when he is in the cafeteria, on the playing field, or on campus during autho-
rized hours.39  However, the Court did not extend this reasoning outside of 
the schoolhouse gates.  Due to the on campus limit of Tinker, the decision 
provides minimal guidance as to when or whether a student may be pu-
nished by a school for off campus speech. 
The next student speech case that the Supreme Court decided was Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser.40  In this case, a student was punished by 
his school for using a sexually explicit metaphor to discuss his friend’s 
candidacy for student counsel in a speech at a school assembly.41  The 
Court balanced “[t]he undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and con-
troversial views in schools and classrooms” against “society’s countervail-
ing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate be-
 
 33. Id.  “Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates 
from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance.  But our 
Constitution says we must take this risk . . . .” Id. at 508. 
 34. Id. at 506. 
 35. Id. at 514. 
 36. Id. at 508. 
 37. Id. at 514. 
 38. Id. at 506. 
 39. Id. at 512-13. 
 40. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 41. See id. at 677-78. 
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havior.”42  The Court deviated from the Tinker test and implied that the 
mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute.  Instead, the Court held 
that “it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohi-
bit the use of vulgar and offensive terms.”43  Under this lewd and vulgar 
standard, the Court found that the First Amendment did not prohibit the 
school from disciplining a student’s sexually explicit speech at a school as-
sembly.44  The Court reasoned that the school stands in loco parentis to the 
students, and therefore has an obligation to protect students from such 
speech.45 
In its analysis, the Court focused on the substance of the speech in con-
junction with the location of its delivery.  Unlike the armbands worn in 
Tinker, the inappropriate speech in Fraser was unrelated to any political 
position.46  Moreover, the fact that such lewd and vulgar speech occurred at 
a high school assembly, toward “an unsuspecting audience of teenage stu-
dents,” weighed in favor of the Bethel School District.47 
The most recent Supreme Court case regarding student speech is Morse 
v. Frederick.48  In this case, the Court upheld the school’s suspension of a 
student who held a banner during an off campus, school-sanctioned Olym-
pic Torch viewing event that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”49  The Court 
held that a school may discipline a student when the speech encourages il-
legal drug use, even if the speech does not cause a disruption and is not 
made in a school-sponsored medium.50 
Once again, the Supreme Court put great emphasis on the fact that the 
school environment has special characteristics.51  While the speech was 
technically off campus, it was made at a school-sponsored event, in the 
presence of school administrators and teachers.52  The Court compared the 
facts of Morse to the Fraser facts, and noted that if Fraser had delivered his 
same speech outside of the school, in a public forum, it would have been 
 
 42. Id. at 681. 
 43. Id. at 683. 
 44. See id. at 686. 
 45. See id. at 684. 
 46. Id. at 685.  The fundamental values of a democratic society must include tolerance 
of opposing political views. Id. at 681. 
 47. Id. at 685 (“A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit 
monologue . . . .”). 
 48. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 49. See id. at 397. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. at 408. 
 52. Id. at 396-97. 
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protected.53  The Court did not explicitly state that the holding was inap-
plicable to off campus speech. 
While affirming the Tinker holding, the Supreme Court in Fraser and 
Morse appears to be establishing exceptions to the substantial disruption 
test, instead of further refining the test.  The Court’s approach has provided 
little, if any, guidance as to what constitutes a substantial disruption or a 
reasonable forecast of a substantial disruption.  Therefore, the lower courts 
have no indication of whether and when schools have the authority to pro-
hibit student online speech. 
C. The Internet 
The Internet adds a complicated wrinkle to the student speech analysis 
because it is not a tangible medium like a school newspaper.  Lorna E. Gil-
lies stated in the article, Addressing the “Cyberspace Fallacy”: Targeting 
the Jurisdiction of an Electronic Consumer Contract, that “[c]yberspace 
has been defined as ‘an on-line community,’”54 and has also been described 
“more crudely as ‘neither here nor there.’”55  Orin Kerr explains that from 
the viewpoint of virtual reality, the Internet is a separate space that is even 
governed by a separate set of legal rules.56  From the viewpoint of physical 
reality, Kerr explains, the Internet is viewed as a means of communica-
tion.57  Therefore, the Internet is both a separate space and a means of 
communication. 
This split persona embodied by the Internet makes it difficult for lower 
courts to define the speech’s specific location.  The inability to define a 
specific location has made it difficult to decide whether to apply the Tinker 
holding, which requires speech to be “on campus” in order to have limited 
First Amendment protection, and therefore possibly be prohibited.  But 
whether a student is posting speech on the Internet at school or from his or 
her home computer does not denote the location of the speech.  This type of 
speech occurs neither on nor off campus.  It is speech on the Internet.  “It’s 
not where you throw the grenade, it’s where the grenade lands,” said An-
 
 53. See id. at 405. 
 54. 16 INT’L. J.L. INFO. TECH. 242, 243 (2008) (citing Matthew R. Burnstein, Conflicts 
on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 78-
82 (1996); A Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOCIETY, http://www.isoc.org/internet/ 
history/brief.shtml). 
 55. Id. (quoting Diana J. P. McKenzie, Commerce on the Net: Surfing Through Cyber-
space Without Getting Wet, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 247, 267 (1996)). 
 56. See Kerr, supra note 13. 
 57. Id. at 360. 
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thony Sanchez, a lawyer who represented the Hermitage School District.58  
Once courts are able to understand the boundary-less location of Internet 
speech, the applicability of Tinker becomes comprehensible. 
Because the Internet is boundary-less, no communications technology of 
the twentieth century presents as much opportunity for uninhibited expres-
sion as does the Internet.59  The far-reaching ability of the Internet signifi-
cantly impacts the lives of students.  Students utilize the Internet for both 
recreational and educational purposes.60  For example, some teachers re-
quire Internet use in their classes by holding students accountable for mate-
rials distributed via email or utilizing various computerized educational 
programs.61  Even if the Internet is not required in the classroom, it is an 
important educational device outside of the classroom.62  With websites 
such as Wikipedia.org and Encyclopedia.com, students have instant access 
to a wealth of knowledge. 
An example of students’ recreational use of the Internet is social net-
working.  Social networking sites have three unique attributes that make 
them more likely to have an impact on the school environment than tangi-
ble off campus speech: (1) the sites’ functions are gathered together in one 
place; (2) the sites have millions of users and daily traffic; and (3) people 
have quick and convenient access to everything that is posted.63  Facebook 
claims to have more than five hundred million active users, with fifty per-
cent logging onto Facebook on any given day.64  MySpace reports to have 
about seventy million users.65  With the large amount of users on these so-
cial networking sites, information posted on the sites can spread like wild-
 
 58. Clifford M. Marks, Free Speech in Question When Talking Out of School, WALL ST. 
J., July 3, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704525704575341353771 
603056.html. 
 59. Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The 
First Amendment in an Online World, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1137 (1996). 
 60. See Garner K. Weng, Type No Evil: The Proper Latitude of Public Educational In-
stitutions in Restricting Expressions of Their Students on the Internet, 20 HASTINGS COMM. 
& ENT. L.J. 751, 764-66 (1998).  Weng describes how students use the Internet to socialize, 
conduct research, gather news, shop, and play games. See id. at 763-66.  Teachers at many 
post-secondary schools, including law schools, are using the Internet to distribute informa-
tion concerning classes and assignments and are also utilizing the Internet to communicate 
with and instruct students. See id. at 763-64. 
 61. See id. at 763. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Michael J. O’Connor, School Speech in the Internet Age: Do Students Shed Their 
Rights When They Pick Up a Mouse, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 459, 478 (2009). 
 64. Press Room Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php? 
statistics (last visited Dec. 19, 2010). 
 65. Dawn C. Chmielewski, MySpace in Second Place Networking Site Continues to 
Lose Ground to Facebook, STAR-LEDGER, June 18, 2009, at 29. 
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fire.  In addition, these sites allow people to post things that are “part diary, 
part photo album, with gossip, favorite music, pet peeves—sometimes even 
phone numbers and home addresses.  And occasionally, revealing pic-
tures.”66  People can even post their current location.67  In addition, users 
can see personal information about their friends, family, and even complete 
strangers. 
While these sites have privacy settings, one can still access information 
even with the privacy settings in place.  On Facebook, the default privacy 
settings allow anyone who attends the user’s school or is in the user’s net-
work to view his or her posts.68  Networks include major cities and major 
universities.69  Therefore, a user’s information is potentially available to 
every person in the city in which he or she is living, and every person who 
is currently attending or attended his or her university.70  Even if the set-
tings are restricted, a user’s friends have access.71  Therefore, an inappro-
priate description of a school official can rapidly become the talk of the 
school. 
Facebook also created the “newsfeed” feature, which lists a user’s ac-
tions on a friend’s homepage, almost like a public announcement.72  As a 
result, when a student writes on someone’s Facebook wall that the principal 
is an alcoholic, not only does the person on whose wall it was written see 
this information,73 but all of the student’s friends on Facebook see it as 
well.  Despite the instant access of the newsfeed feature, users complain 
that they want access to more information, and at a faster rate.74  MyS-
pace75 and Twitter76 have implemented newsfeed features as well. 
 
 66. Pete Williams, MySpace, Facebook Attract Online Predators, MSNBC (Feb. 3, 
2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11165576/ns/nightly_news/. 
 67. J.D. Bierdsdorfer, Q & A: Crowding Out on Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2008, 
8:29 AM), http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/31/qa-crowding-out-on-facebook/. 
 68. O’Connor, supra note 63. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 478-79 (“When you post a picture you later regret, it is probably not comfort-
ing that it was ‘only’ available to the Philadelphia major metropolitan area or every Penn 
State student and alum.”). 
 71. Id. at 479. 
 72. Id. at 480.  When a user changes his or her profile picture, updates his or her status, 
or writes a message on a friend’s wall, this information is posted on the newsfeed. Id. 
 73. The “wall” is a place to share content with other facebook users. See Help Center, 
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/? faq=13153&tq (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
 74. Nick O’Neill, Facebook Needs a Faster Newsfeed, ALL FACEBOOK: THE UNOFFICIAL 
FACEBOOK RESOURCE (Mar. 26, 2008, 5:18 PM), http://www.allfacebook.com/facebook-
needs-a-faster-newsfeed-2008-03. 
 75. Robin Wauters, MySpace Launches New Set of APIs With Google, OneRiot and 
Groovy, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 9, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/12/09/myspace-realtime-
api-google-oneriot-groovy/ (discussing how when a MySpace user posts content from 
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Due to the unique characteristics of the Internet and its far-reaching in-
fluence on the everyday lives of students, online speech is more likely to 
have a wider impact on the school environment than, for example, speech 
in an underground newspaper.  Therefore, courts are hesitant to find that 
school officials are unable to discipline a student for online speech under 
the First Amendment simply because the speech was not “on campus” in 
the traditional sense.77  The Supreme Court has not decided a student 
speech case concerning online speech, leaving lower courts with no guid-
ance on how to address this inquiry. 
II.  LOWER COURTS’ ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS WHETHER SCHOOL 
REASONABLY FORECASTED SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION78 
Given the Supreme Court’s lack of direction on the school speech mat-
ter, the lower courts’ decisions lack any sense of uniformity.  Lower courts 
deciding whether a reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial disruption ex-
ists have examined several factors, including the connection between the 
speech and the school, predictions of disruption, and the content of the 
speech. 
I begin this section with a discussion of cases concerning non-Internet 
speech and examine whether the evidence in the cases supports a finding of 
a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption to the school environment.  
When the student posts the speech using an off campus computer, such In-
ternet speech is not on campus in the traditional sense.  Therefore, while 
not the main subject of this Note, non-Internet speech provides a helpful 
backdrop when first analyzing student Internet speech.  Next, this Part will 
discuss student Internet speech created on an off campus computer.  Due to 
the advent of the Internet, lower court opinions have shifted away from a 
bright line standard according to which off campus speech is afforded full 
First Amendment protection, to a broader approach not limited by the phys-
 
another site, it can go directly to his or her MySpace activity stream, creating a link back to 
the third-party site). 
 76. Streaming API Documentation, TWITTER, http://dev.twitter.com/pages/streaming_ 
api (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (stating that there are three ways to stream information).  The 
Twitter newsfeed feature allows Twitter users to view public statuses from multiple users on 
one page. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (2002) 
(finding student speech made over a home computer constituted on campus speech because 
circulation of the speech on school grounds was inevitable). 
 78. This Note will not be focusing on proven substantial disruption.  Rather, this Note 
will focus on school officials’ reasonable forecast of substantial disruption when no such 
disruption has actually occurred.  However, evidence of disruption to the school environ-
ment may be a factor in determining whether a reasonable risk of substantial disruption ex-
ists. 
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ical characteristics of the speech.  Under this approach, lower court opi-
nions have made speech more susceptible to prohibition. 
A. Non-Internet Speech and Whether School Reasonably Forecasted 
Substantial Disruption 
While the purpose of this Note is to determine when a school district 
may discipline student speech that was made over the Internet, outside of 
school, the lower court cases dealing with non-Internet speech are a helpful 
backdrop for understanding newer cases dealing with online speech.  The 
lower courts appear to be migrating away from a strict standard where off 
campus speech is afforded full First Amendment protection and therefore 
can never be disciplined, to Tinker’s dicta where speech may be discip-
lined, regardless of where the speech takes place, if it poses a reasonably 
foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the school environment.79  In 
determining whether a school district was reasonable in forecasting a sub-
stantial disruption, lower courts consider the intent of the speaker and 
whether actual disruption resulted.  Nonetheless, the lower courts’ jurispru-
dence is disjointed as a result of an unclear and outdated standard for stu-
dent speech cases. 
1. On Campus 
In Chandler v. McMinnville School District,80 the Ninth Circuit found 
that the passive expression of an opinion on a button did not pose a risk of 
substantial disruption to the school environment.  In this case, two students 
wore buttons to school in support of a teacher strike.81  The vice principal 
ordered the students to remove the buttons and suspended them for the re-
mainder of the school day.82  The court found that the speech was not vul-
gar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive, and therefore could not be ana-
lyzed under Fraser.83  Therefore, the court applied Tinker’s dicta, requiring 
school officials to justify their decision to discipline by showing “facts 
which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial 
disruption of or material interference with school activities.”84  The court 
noted that the First Amendment does not require school officials to wait 
 
 79. I argue in this Note that the location of the speech is irrelevant.  The impact of the 
speech is what should be at issue. 
 80. 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 81. Id. at 526. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. at 530. 
 84. Id. at 529 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 
(1969)). 
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until disruption actually occurs because they in fact “have a duty to prevent 
the occurrence of disturbances.”85  In deciding whether the evidence 
showed a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption, the court considered 
whether the speech was inherently disruptive and the fact that the speech 
was directed at school faculty.86  The court found that while the buttons 
displaying the word “scab” could be “interpreted as insulting, disrespectful 
or even threatening,” such a passive expression is not the same as “those 
activities which inherently distract students and break down the regimenta-
tion of the classroom.”87 The Court therefore held that the district court 
erred in dismissing the complaint.88 
In contrast, in B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 School District,89 the Eighth 
Circuit found that a school’s ban of clothing that displayed the Confederate 
flag was constitutionally permissible.  In that case, two students were sus-
pended from school for wearing clothing that displayed the Confederate 
flag.90  In analyzing whether it was reasonable for the school officials to 
suspect material and substantial disruption, the court focused on evidence 
of actual disruptions related to the Confederate flag or race.91  These dis-
ruptions included an ongoing spat between Farmington High School and 
neighboring Festus High School, in which two Farmington basketball play-
ers allegedly used racial slurs against two black Festus players in connec-
tion with the display of the Confederate flag outside the locker rooms, a 
white student urinated on a black student, causing the black student to 
withdraw from the school, and numerous other racial slurs were used and 
swastikas drawn at the school.92  Based on these incidents, the court found 
that the risk of substantial disruption related to the Confederate flag was 
reasonably foreseeable.93 
While the Eighth Circuit focused on evidence of actual disruption in the 
B.W.A. case, the Fifth Circuit noted in A.M. v. Cash94 that Tinker does not 
require a showing of past disruption to prove a reasonable forecast of sub-
stantial disruption.  In this case, two girls were suspended for bringing bags 
decorated with the Confederate flag to school.  The court found that the 
 
 85. Id. (citing Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir.1973)). 
 86. Id. at 531. 
 87. Id. at 530-31 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 88. Id. at 531. 
 89. 554 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 90. See id. at 736. 
 91. See id. at 739-40. 
 92. Id. at 739. 
 93. See id. at 741. 
 94. 585 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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“racial tension and hostility at the school justified defendants’ ban on visi-
ble displays of the Confederate flag” at school.95 
The most recent case concerning on campus student speech that did not 
result in substantial disruption is DeFabio v. East Hampton Union Free 
School District.96  In this case, a rumor spread through East Hampton High 
School that Daniel DeFabio, a tenth grade student at the school, made a 
comment to a friend concerning another student’s ethnic background.97  
DeFabio allegedly stated, “one down, forty thousand to go.”98  The student 
community acted antagonistically toward DeFabio after the rumor spread.99  
DeFabio’s mother asked the principal if DeFabio could read a declaration 
of his innocence over the school’s public address system, or in the alterna-
tive, read the statement during a school assembly or have the school distri-
bute the statement to the students in written form.100  The principal denied 
all the requests due to the risk that any statement could ignite the current 
tensions in the school.101 
The court applied the Tinker standard, asking whether “the record . . . 
demonstrate[s] . . . facts which might reasonably have led school authori-
ties to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school 
activities.”102  In applying the Tinker standard, the court noted that the Su-
preme Court’s focus in Tinker was not on the actual content of the speech 
but rather the “extent to which the speech would be accompanied by ‘dis-
order or disturbance.’”103  To determine whether the School District could 
forecast disruption, the court considered the fact that actual disruption had 
already occurred.104  The police were assigned to protect Daniel’s home, 
Daniel had received death threats, and he had admitted that he was scared 
to return to school.105  Therefore, the court found that it was not arbitrary or 
irrational for the School District to forecast a substantial disruption of the 
school environment if Daniel’s speech were allowed.106 
 
 95. Id. at 224. 
 96. 623 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 97. See id. at 74. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  While this case does not concern school discipline, the analysis utilized by the 
Second Circuit is appropriate for purposes of this Note. 
 102. Id. at 78 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 
(1969)). 
 103. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508). 
 104. See id. at 79. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 82. 
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2. Off Campus 
One of the first cases after Tinker to address off campus speech that did 
not result in substantial disruption was Thomas v. Board of Education.107  
In that case, four students in Granville Junior-Senior High School in ups-
tate New York produced a satirical publication, addressed to the school 
community, containing articles concerning masturbation and prostitu-
tion.108  The publication was sold to classmates at the end of each school 
day at a store in Granville.109  After the Board of Education president 
learned of the paper from her son, she presented it to the school principal 
and the students were disciplined.110  The Second Circuit adopted a strict 
standard that focused primarily on the location of the speech.111  The court 
stated: “Here, because school officials have ventured out of the school yard 
and into the general community where the freedom accorded expression is 
at its zenith, their actions must be evaluated by the principles that bind 
government officials in the public arena.”112 
This strict standard was rationalized by the court under a test which ba-
lanced the individual’s First Amendment right against the school’s interest 
in maintaining an appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.113  
The individual’s interest includes avoiding a chilling effect on speech.114  
The court reasoned that this country was built on the premise that expres-
sion must flourish and that this right applies to students.115  Therefore, the 
Second Circuit found that any speech that took place off campus could not 
be disciplined by the school. 
While the court utilized a strict standard of no punishment for off cam-
pus speech, it did make mention of the substantial disruption test in its re-
jection of Judge Newman’s concurring opinion, which stated that school 
officials may regulate allegedly “indecent” expression by students in the 
general community.116  The court recognized that there could be a situation 
in which students incite “substantial disruption within the school from 
 
 107. 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 108. Id. at 1045. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1046. 
 111. See id. at 1050 (stating that the on campus activities were de minimis and therefore 
properly deemed off campus). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. at 1049. 
 114. See id. at 1047, 1049 (stating that at the heart of the First Amendment is the inescap-
able relationship between the uninhibited flow of information and a self-governing people). 
 115. See id. at 1049 (stating that nowhere is unrestrained expression more vital than in 
our nation’s schools). 
 116. See id. at 1053 n.18. 
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some remote locale.”117  Nevertheless, the court did not address this scena-
rio because no such disruption occurred in the case.118 
The Second Circuit indirectly defined the substantial disruption test by 
rejecting the possibility of discipline when the school can foresee that 
speech will reach school grounds, without resulting in any actual disrup-
tion.119  The court supported the opinion that distribution of speech inside 
the school does not amount to a substantial disruption, noting that an off 
campus publication criticizing the school itself will inevitably reach cam-
pus.120  The court noted that this standard “invites school officials ‘to seize 
upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for barring 
the expression of unpopular views.’”121  Therefore, if courts adopted such a 
standard, a school could essentially punish a student for watching an X-
rated film at home or for purchasing a dirty magazine at a local store.122 
Similarly, in Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board,123 the Fifth Cir-
cuit found that a student could not be disciplined for speech that took place 
off campus, even though it was directed at the school principal.124  In this 
case, a student drew a picture in his house of his school under siege, with 
obscene remarks regarding his principal and a brick being thrown at the 
principal.125  Two years later, the picture was brought to school by the stu-
dent’s brother and shown to his bus driver.126  The Fifth Circuit stated that 
the speech was “not on campus or even speech directed at the campus” be-
cause the drawing was completed at home, stored for two years, and not in-
tended by the student to be brought into school.127 
While the Second and Fifth Circuits did not adopt the substantial disrup-
tion standard established in Tinker, the Seventh Circuit utilized this test in 
Boucher v. School Board.128  In this case, a junior at Greenfield High 
School near Milwaukee wrote a piece in an underground newspaper created 
 
 117. Id. at 1052 n.17. 
 118. Id. (finding no substantial disruption because school officials did not take action for 
six full days and only punished the students because the school board believed the publica-
tion was “morally offensive, indecent, and obscene,” not because of fear of disruption). 
 119. See id. at 1053 n.18 (stating that schools’ power to punish students for indecent ex-
pression is denied when they seek to punish off campus expression “simply because they 
reasonably foresee that in-school distribution may result”). 
 120. See id. 
 121. Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)). 
 122. See id. 
 123. 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 124. See id. at 618. 
 125. See id. at 611. 
 126. See id. 
 127. Id. at 615. 
 128. 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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by students of Greenfield, in which he described how to hack into the 
school’s computers.129  The underground newspaper, entitled The Last, was 
distributed on campus.130  The court in this case found that “[u]nder exist-
ing case law . . . a reasonable forecast of disruption is all that would be re-
quired of the [School] Board” to make discipline appropriate.131  In analyz-
ing whether the School Board reasonably forecasted a substantial 
disruption resulting from the newspaper article, the court found that speech 
instructing students how to hack into a school computer was a “call to ac-
tion.”132  The court found that it was reasonable for the School Board to 
forecast a risk of substantial disruption when the speech was a call for ac-
tion.133 
In 2008, the Sixth Circuit decided Lowery v. Euverard,134 which in-
volved off campus student speech that did not result in a substantial disrup-
tion.  In this case, four students on the Jefferson County High School foot-
ball team in Tennessee created a petition that stated: “I hate Coach Euvard 
[sic] and I don’t want to play for him.”135  Eighteen players signed the peti-
tion.136  The four students who created and distributed the petition were 
kicked off the team.137 
Plaintiffs argued that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment 
because the petition did not substantially disrupt the team.  Nevetheless, the 
Sixth Circuit noted that “Tinker does not require school officials to wait un-
til the horse has left the barn before closing the door.  Nor does Tinker ‘re-
quire certainty that disruption will occur.’”138  To require a showing of ac-
tual disruption would put school officials between the “proverbial rock and 
hard place: either they allow disruption to occur, or they are guilty of a 
constitutional violation.  Such a rule is not required by Tinker, and would 
be disastrous public policy . . . .”139  Therefore, the court considered wheth-
er the speech posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial disruption 
to the school environment.140 
 
 129. See id. at 822. 
 130. Id. at 829. 
 131. Id. at 828. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 135. Id. at 585. 
 136. Id. at 586. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 591-92 (quoting Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 767 (9th Cir. 
2006)). 
 139. Id. at 596. 
 140. See id. at 593. 
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To determine whether it was reasonable for the school district to forecast 
a risk of substantial disturbance to the school environment under Tinker, 
the court considered the fact that the speech could break apart the team.141  
The court found that empirical data was not needed,142 a common-sense 
conclusion that there could reasonably be a substantial disruption would 
suffice.143 
Plaintiffs further argued that the petition was not disruptive because they 
did not intend to present it to school officials until after the football sea-
son.144  However, the court found the intent of the speaker to be irrelevant 
for purposes of determining whether the expression posed a risk of substan-
tial disruption. 
B. Online Student Speech and Reasonable Forecast of Substantial 
Disruption145 
1. Cases in Favor of the School 
The most recent case involving student online speech where the court 
held in favor of the school district is J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area 
School District.146  In that case, an eighth grade student created a website 
entitled “Teacher Sux,” on his home computer.147  This website consisted 
of multiple web pages that made derogatory comments about the student’s 
algebra teacher and the principal of his school.148  The student was ex-
pelled.149 
Rejecting plaintiff’s argument that Tinker should be read narrowly to re-
quire an actual disruption, the court utilized the reasonable fear of disrup-
tion analysis.150  Under this analysis, the court stated that “while there must 
be more than some mild distraction or curiosity created by the speech, 
complete chaos is not required for a school district to punish student 
speech.”151  The court considered the actual disruption to the entire school 
 
 141. See id. (stating that abstract concepts like team morale and unity are not susceptible 
to quantifiable measurement but have a large impact on a team). 
 142. See id. at 594. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. at 604. 
 145. This section will focus on the potential effect of Internet speech and not on the loca-
tion where the speech is made. 
 146. 807 A.2d 847 (2002). 
 147. See id. at 850-51. 
 148. Id. at 851. 
 149. Id. at 853. 
 150. See id. at 856. 
 151. Id. at 868. 
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community, including the students, teachers, and parents.152  The court 
found that the “most significant disruption caused by the posting of the 
website . . . was [the] direct and indirect impact of the emotional and physi-
cal injuries” to the teacher who was the target of the speech.153  The teacher 
was unable to complete the school year and, due to stress and anxiety, took 
a medical leave of absence the following year.154  The teacher’s absence for 
over twenty days at the end of the school year required the use of three 
substitute teachers.155  The court found that the use of multiple substitute 
teachers “unquestionably disrupted the delivery of instruction to the stu-
dents and adversely impacted the education environment.”156 
In addition, “[c]ertain students expressed anxiety about the website and 
for their safety.  Students visited counselors.”157  The atmosphere of the 
school was described “as if a student had died.”158  Parents also voiced 
concern for school safety and questioned the adequacy of the substitute 
teachers’ instruction.159  In sum, the court found that “the web site created 
disorder and significantly and adversely impacted the delivery of instruc-
tion.”160 
In LaVine v. Blaine School District,161 James LaVine, an eleventh grade 
student at Blaine High School in Minnesota, wrote a poem about entering 
the school and shooting twenty-eight people dead.162  James handed the 
poem to his English teacher for her opinion.163  Several months earlier, a 
student had shot and killed two students and injured twenty-five others at a 
high school in Portland, Oregon.164  James’s school imposed an emergency 
expulsion, believing that his presence posed a threat or danger to himself, 
other students, or school personnel.165 
In this case, the Ninth Circuit discerned three areas of student speech 
and their governing standards.  According to the court: “(1) vulgar, lewd, 
obscene and plainly offensive speech is governed by Fraser; (2) school-
 
 152. See id. at 869. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 852. 
 155. Id. at 869. 
 156. Id. at 853. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 162. Id. at 983. 
 163. Id. at 984. 
 164. Id. at 984 n.2. 
 165. Id. at 985, 986 n.3. 
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sponsored speech is governed by Hazelwood; and (3) speech that falls into 
neither of these categories is governed by Tinker.”166  The court found that 
James’s poem fell under the third category because it was not vulgar, lewd, 
or obscene, nor was it sponsored by the school.  In noting that Tinker does 
not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before 
taking action, the court adopted Tinker’s dicta, which states that discipline 
against a student for his or her speech does not violate the First Amend-
ment when the evidence shows that the school reasonably forecasted a sub-
stantial disruption resulting from the speech.167  In fact, the court noted that 
Tinker does not require certainty that disruption will even occur; rather, 
“the existence of facts which might reasonably lead school officials to fore-
cast substantial disruption” is sufficient.168 
In its analysis of whether the school district showed facts that a reasona-
ble forecast of substantial disruption existed, the court looked at the totality 
of the relevant facts.  The court looked not only to James’s actions but also 
“to all of the circumstances confronting the school officials that might rea-
sonably portend disruption.”169  It reasoned that school officials knew facts 
that in isolation would probably not have warranted a response, but that in 
combination might give school officials a reasonable basis for taking ac-
tion.170  James had had previous suicidal intentions, had recently broken up 
with his girlfriend (whom he was reportedly stalking), had several discipli-
nary problems in the past, and had been absent from school for three days 
prior to handing in the poem.171  The poem itself “was filled with imagery 
of violent death and suicide.”172  The court found that at the extreme it 
could be interpreted as a warning of the shooting of James’s fellow stu-
dents, and at a minimum as “a cry for help from a troubled teenager con-
templating a suicide.”173  Considering James’s history, the content of the 
poem itself, and the occurrence of actual school shootings, the court held 
that “these circumstances were sufficient to have led school authorities rea-
sonably to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with 
school activities—specifically, that James was intending to inflict injury 
upon himself or others.”174 
 
 166. Id. at 988-89. 
 167. Id. at 989. 
 168. Id. (citing Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. 
 171. Id. at 989-90. 
 172. Id. at 990. 
 173. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 174. Id. 
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In 2007, the Second Circuit also came down in favor of the school dis-
trict in  Wisniewski v. Board of Education.175  An eighth grade student at 
Weedsport Middle School in upstate New York used AOL Instant Messag-
ing (“IM”) software on his parents’ home computer.176  The student’s AOL 
IM icon, which serves as an identifier of the sender, was a small drawing of 
a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head with the words “Kill Mr. Vander-
Molen,” the student’s English teacher.177  The student sent IM messages 
displaying the icon to approximately fifteen people.178  When the school 
learned about the icon, it suspended the student for five days.179  In addi-
tion, the English teacher requested to stop teaching the student’s class.180 
The court quickly dismissed the fact that the student posted the messages 
from an off campus location, stating that the court has recognized that “off-
campus conduct can create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption with-
in a school.”181  To determine whether a substantial risk of disruption was 
foreseeable, the court first analyzed the risk that the speech would come to 
the attention of school authorities, and, second, whether it was reasonable 
for the school officials to predict a substantial disruption to the school envi-
ronment.182  The court was in agreement that it was reasonably foreseeable 
that the IM icon would come to the attention of school authorities.183  In 
addition, the court found that the “threatening content of the icon,” the “ex-
tensive distribution” of the content (fifteen people), and the time period for 
which the speech was distributed (three weeks) all made the risk “foreseea-
ble to a reasonable person.”184  Regarding whether it was reasonable for the 
school officials to predict a substantial disruption to the school environ-
ment, the panel was divided as to whether the fact that the speech actually 
did reach the campus obviates any analysis of whether such a disruption 
was foreseeable.185  Nonetheless, the court found there to be no doubt that 
once made known to the teacher and other school officials, the icon “would 
foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school envi-
ronment.”186  In conclusion, the court held that the IM icon crosses “the 
 
 175. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 176. Id. at 35. 
 177. Id. at 36. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 39 (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
 182. See id. at 39-40. 
 183. See id. at 39. 
 184. Id. at 39-40. 
 185. Id. at 40 n.4. 
 186. Id. at 40. 
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boundary of protected speech and constitutes student conduct that poses a 
reasonably foreseeable risk that the icon would come to the attention of 
school authorities and that it would ‘materially and substantially disrupt the 
work and discipline of the school.’”187 
In 2008, the Second Circuit again decided in favor of a school district.  
In Doninger v. Niehoff,188 Avery Doninger, a student at Lewis Mills High 
School, brought a case against her school’s administration after she was 
prohibited from running for Senior Class Secretary.  After the school ad-
ministration cancelled the battle-of-the-bands performance entitled “Jamf-
est,” Doninger posted a message on her publicly accessible blog that stated, 
“Jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office . . . [a]nd here is a 
letter my mom sent to Paula [Schwartz] and cc’d Karissa [Niehoff] to get 
an idea of what to write if you want to write something or call her to piss 
her off more. im [sic] down.”189  After the blog post, the school administra-
tion received numerous phone calls and email messages about Jamfest.190  
During the two days following the post, school administrators Schwartz 
and Niehoff missed or arrived late to several school-related activities.191 
Noting that the Supreme Court has yet to address the scope of a school’s 
authority to regulate speech that does not occur on school grounds or at a 
school-sponsored event, the court nonetheless found that such speech may 
be disciplined when the conduct “would foreseeably create a risk of sub-
stantial disruption within the school environment.”192  As a background to 
help decide the novel issue of online speech, the court applied some of the 
reasoning from Thomas.  The Second Circuit noted the “need to draw a 
clear line between student activity that ‘affects matters of legitimate con-
cern to the school community,’ and activity that does not.”193  In addition, 
the court used Judge Newman’s concurrence in Thomas arguing that “terri-
toriality is not necessarily a useful concept in determining the limit of 
 
 187. Id. at 38-39 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007)). 
 188. 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 189. Id. at 45. 
 190. See id. at 44.  Importantly, before the blog post, four student council members went 
on a school computer and sent out a mass email requesting that the recipients contact the 
district superintendent, Paula Schwartz, to urge that Jamfest be held as scheduled. See id.  
The school administration received an overwhelming number of telephone calls and emails 
from people concerning Jamfest. See id. 
 191. Id. at 46. 
 192. Id. at 48 (citing Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40).  It is noteworthy that the court rejected 
the Fraser test because it is not clear whether Fraser applies to off campus speech. See id. at 
49-50. 
 193. Id. at 48 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1058 n.13 (1979)). 
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[school administrators’] authority.”194  With these two points in mind, the 
court then discussed the foreseeable risk of substantial disruption standard. 
Utilizing the Wisniewski framework to determine whether the speech 
would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption, the Second Circuit 
again began by considering whether it was foreseeable that the off campus 
expression would reach campus.195  When analyzing this first prong of the 
analysis, the court considered the student’s intent, the content of the 
speech, and the fact that the speech did reach school administrators.196  In 
this case, Doninger’s intent was specifically “to encourage her fellow stu-
dents to read and respond,” the speech directly pertained to school events, 
and school administrators Schwartz and Niehoff saw the blog post.197  
Therefore, the court concluded that it was foreseeable that the off campus 
speech would reach campus.198 
The court further found that the blog post “‘foreseeably create[d] a risk 
of substantial disruption within the school environment.’”199  In analyzing 
the foreseeable risk prong, the court considered three factors: the language 
of the speech, the fact that the speech was misleading, and the type of dis-
cipline imposed.200  In terms of the language of the speech, Doninger’s post 
included vulgar and “potentially incendiary language,” which the court de-
termined to be evidence of a potential risk of disruption.201  For the second 
factor of misleading speech, which the court found to be the most signifi-
cant, the court directed its attention to Doninger’s post, which falsely stated 
that Jamfest had been cancelled, while in reality the school administration 
had offered the possibility of rescheduling the event.202  The court found 
that Doninger disseminated this false information in order to direct more 
calls and emails to the school administration.203  Given these circums-
tances, the court found that the speech “posed a substantial risk that [the 
school] administrators . . . would be diverted from their core educational 
responsibilities by the need to dissipate misguided anger or confusion over 
Jamfest’s purported cancelation.”204 
 
 194. Id. at 48-49 (citing Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1058 n.13). 
 195. See id. at 50. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. 
 199. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d 
Cir. 2007)). 
 200. See id. at 50-52. 
 201. See id. at 51. 
 202. See id. 
 203. See id. 
 204. Id. at 51-52. 
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In analyzing the second factor, the court also considered the fact that the 
disruption had already begun to occur.205  In refuting Doninger’s argument 
that Tinker is not satisfied because the controversy at the school may have 
resulted from the mass email created by the four student council members 
and not Doninger’s blog post, the court utilized the Ninth Circuit’s elabora-
tion in LaVine that “[t]he question is not whether there has been actual dis-
ruption, but whether the school officials ‘might reasonably portend disrup-
tion’ from the student expression at issue.”206 
Lastly, the Court analyzed the third factor, namely, the relationship of 
the school’s discipline to the student’s extracurricular role as a student gov-
ernment leader.207  The court noted that Doninger’s conduct “risked not on-
ly the disruption of efforts to settle the Jamfest dispute, but also frustration 
of the proper operation of [the school’s] student government.”208  The court 
found that Doninger’s speech undermined the values that student govern-
ment is designed to promote, such as teaching good citizenship.209  Consi-
dering the cumulative effect of the three factors, the court held that Donin-
ger’s post “created a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the work 
and discipline of the school.”210 
The next case concerning student online speech, in which the court held 
in favor of the school district, was Snyder v. Blue Mountain School Dis-
trict.211  J.S., an eighth grade honor student at Blue Mountain Middle 
School in Pennsylvania, created a parody profile about her principal on 
MySpace from her home computer.212  J.S. was suspended from school for 
ten days.213  The case is currently before the Third Circuit for a rehearing 
en banc.  The court declined to decide whether a school official may dis-
cipline a student for lewd, vulgar, or offensive off campus speech that has 
an effect on campus because the speech falls under Tinker.214 
While the court utilized the general rule established in Tinker, it col-
lapsed the two-prong test utilized in both Wisniewski215 and Doninger,216 
 
 205. See id. at 52 (stating that Doninger herself testified that students were “all riled up” 
and that a sit-in was threatened). 
 206. Id. at 51 (quoting LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 207. See id. at 52. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. at 52. 
 210. Id. at 53. 
 211. 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc granted No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. June 3, 
2010). 
 212. See id. at 291.  The profile referred to the principal as a “sex addict, fagass.” Id. 
 213. Id. at 293. 
 214. See id. at 298. 
 215. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
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and instead simply analyzed whether the speech “created a significant 
threat of substantial disruption in the Middle School.”217  Before delving 
into the facts of the case, the court noted that school officials may not limit 
student speech simply because of a “mere desire to avoid the discomfort 
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint,” but 
that school officials also need not wait until a substantial disruption actual-
ly occurs.218  The court further refined the general Tinker standard by stat-
ing that “if a school can point to a well-founded expectation of disrup-
tion—especially one based on past incidents arising out of similar speech—
the restriction may pass constitutional muster.”219  Additionally, the court 
noted that off campus speech that “reasonably threatens to cause a substan-
tial disruption of or material interference with a school need not satisfy any 
geographical technicality in order to be regulated pursuant to Tinker.”220  
Considering these issues, the court defined the standard in this case to be a 
balance between the exception based on substantial disruption on the one 
hand, and the protected nature of off campus student speech on the other.221 
In balancing the substantial disruption exception against the protected 
nature of student off campus speech, the court considered the speech’s con-
tent, the target of the speech, the student’s intent, access to the speech, the 
legality of the speech, and the actual disruption that resulted.222  Due to the 
disturbing content of the speech, the court found the principal’s cause for 
discipline was not simply a “petty desire” to suppress speech that criticized 
him.223  The court was very influenced by the potential harm that the 
speech posed to the principal, finding, for example, that the speech under-
mined the principal’s authority within the school.224  The principal testified 
that he noticed a “severe deterioration in discipline in the Middle School, 
 
 216. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.  In these cases, the courts first determined whether 
the speech made its way onto campus due to its effect on the school, and then, only if this 
factor was satisfied, examined whether the school district, in punishing the student for his or 
her expression, infringed on the student’s First Amendment right. See Snyder, 593 F.3d at 
298. 
 217. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 298. 
 218. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 
(1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 219. Id. (quoting Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2000)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 220. Id. at 301. 
 221. Id. at 299. 
 222. See id. at 300. 
 223. Id.  The profile contained comments such as “kidsrockmybed,” and the listed inter-
ests included “fucking in my office,” “hitting on students and their parents,” and “mainly 
watch[ing] the playboy channel on directv.” Id. at 291. 
 224. Id. at 302. 
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especially among the eighth graders,” following the publication and pu-
nishment.225  In addition, the court found that it was likely that parents 
would begin questioning the principal’s conduct.226 
The court took into account the fact that J.S. directly targeted the prin-
cipal when he misappropriated the principal’s photograph from the school’s 
website and inserted it into the fictitious MySpace profile.227  J.S.’s intent 
was evidenced by the fact that she created the profile as a public means of 
humiliation in the context of the principal’s role, and before those who 
knew him in this context, and not merely as “a personal, private, or ano-
nymous expression of frustration or anger.”228  This made it reasonable for 
the school to predict a risk of substantial disruption.229  In addition, J.S.’s 
intention to have the speech reach her school is evidenced by the fact that 
she only allowed Blue Mountain School students to view the profile.230  
The fact that the profile contained “potentially illegal” speech had no bear-
ing on Tinker’s substantial disruption test.231  The court noted that the po-
tential impact of the profile’s language alone was enough.232  Nonetheless, 
the court found that a principal may regulate student speech “rising to this 
level of vulgarity and containing such reckless and damaging information 
as to undermine the principal’s authority within the school, and potentially 
arouse suspicions among the school community about his character.”233 
2. Cases in Favor of the Student 
In Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District,234 a junior at Woodland 
High School created an Internet homepage from his home computer, which 
could be accessed by other Internet users.  The homepage used vulgar lan-
guage to criticize the teachers, principal, and the school’s own home-
page.235  It also invited readers to contact the school principal to share their 
opinions regarding the school, and contained a hyperlink directly to Wood-
land High School’s homepage.236  The student was suspended for ten 
 
 225. Id. at 294. 
 226. See id. at 301. 
 227. See id. at 300. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See id. at 300-01 (stating that at least twenty-two members of the school viewed the 
profile within days). 
 231. Id. at 301-02. 
 232. See id. 
 233. Id. at 302. 
 234. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
 235. See id. at 1177. 
 236. See id. 
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days.237  Utilizing the Tinker test, the court found that “[w]hile speech may 
be limited based upon a fear or projection of such disruption, that fear must 
be ‘reasonable’ and not an ‘undifferentiated fear’ of a disturbance.”238  In 
this case, the principal’s own testimony indicated that he disciplined the 
student because he was upset by the content of the homepage, and not be-
cause of a fear of disruption or interference with school discipline.239  The 
court held that “[d]isliking or being upset by the content of a student’s 
speech is not an acceptable justification for limiting student speech under 
Tinker.”240 
In a subsequent case, Emmett v. Kent School District No. 415,241  a se-
nior at Kentlake High School posted a web page on the Internet from his 
home computer.  The web page was entitled “Unofficial Kentlake High 
Home Page,” and included commentary on the school’s administration and 
faculty, as well as a section containing mock obituaries, where viewers 
could vote on who should die next.242  The student was first put on emer-
gency expulsion, which was later modified to a five day suspension.243  The 
student moved for a temporary restraining order against the Kent School 
District.244  Applying the Tinker and Fraser standards, the court looked to 
the student’s intent, the content of the speech, and the actual disruption re-
sulting from the speech.245  Finding no evidence that the student “intended 
to threaten anyone, did actually threaten anyone, or manifested any violent 
tendencies whatsoever,” the court enjoined the school from enforcing the 
short-term suspension.246 
One year later, the Western District of Pennsylvania decided Killion v. 
Franklin Regional School District.247  In this case, a student at Franklin 
Regional High School compiled a “Top Ten” list about the athletic director 
that contained, inter alia, statements about the director’s appearance, in-
cluding the size of his genitals.248  The student created the list on his home 
 
 237. See id. at 1179. 
 238. Id. at 1180 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
508-09 (1969)). 
 239. See id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
 242. Id. at 1089. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See id. at 1090. 
 246. See id. 
 247. 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
 248. See id. at 448. 
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computer and then emailed it to his friends.249  After copies of the list were 
found in the school and in the school’s teachers’ lounge, the student was 
suspended for ten days.250  The court analyzed the online speech under 
Tinker’s general standard because the “overwhelming weight of authority 
has analyzed student speech (whether on or off campus) in accordance with 
Tinker.”251 
In response to the school district’s argument that it found the list to be 
“rude, abusive and demeaning,” the court noted that while a “mere desire to 
avoid discomfort or unpleasantness is not enough . . . if a school can point 
to a well founded expectation of disruption—especially one based on past 
incidents arising out of similar speech—the restriction may pass constitu-
tional muster.”252  Although the school argued that the student had created 
similar lists in the past, and had been warned that if he created such lists 
again he would punished, it did not present any evidence that the student’s 
earlier lists had caused a disruption.253  Therefore, the court found that the 
events did “not support an expectation of disruption defense.”254 
It is noteworthy that the court declined to apply Fraser’s lewd, vulgar, or 
profane test to off campus online speech.255  In Fraser, Justice Brennan 
noted in his concurring opinion that if the student “gave the same speech 
outside of the school environment, he could not have been penalized simp-
ly because government officials considered his language to be inappro-
priate.”256  Applying Justice Brennan’s comment to the facts in the Killion 
case, the court found that while the top ten list contained multiple vulgari-
ties,257 the relevant speech occurred within the student’s home and was not 
connected with any school activity.258  Therefore, the court found that the 
suspension violated the First Amendment.259 
The next case that held student online speech could not be disciplined as 
a result of the lack of evidence that a foreseeable risk of substantial disrup-
 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 448-49. 
 251. Id. at 455. 
 252. Id. (quoting Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2000)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 253. See id. at 455. 
 254. Id. at 456. 
 255. See id. at 456-57. 
 256. Id. at 456 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986)). 
 257. The site contained the statement: “[B]ecause of his extensive gut factor, the ‘man’ 
hasn’t seen his own penis in over a decade.” Id. at 457. 
 258. See id. at 456. 
 259. See id. at 458. 
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tion existed was Layshock v. Hermitage School District.260  In this case, 
Justin Layshock (“Justin”), a senior at Hickory High School, created a pa-
rody profile of his school’s principal on MySpace.261  Justin created the 
profile on his grandmother’s computer, at her home, during non-school 
hours.262  The profile contained a picture of the principal that Justin had 
copied from the school’s website, and inappropriate descriptions of the 
principal.263  During this time, three other parody profiles about the prin-
cipal were created.264  Justin was suspended for ten days.265 
Noting that the mere fact that the Internet may be accessed at school 
does not suffice to authorize school officials to become “censors of the 
world-wide web,” the court rejected a geographical test for online 
speech.266  The court stated that, in the same way that “[t]he reach of school 
administrators is not strictly limited to the school’s physical property . . . . 
the mere presence of a student on school property does not trigger the 
school’s authority.”267  Therefore, under Tinker, the court required the 
school to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the speech and a fear of 
substantial disruption of the school environment.268  The court held that the 
“substantial disruption” standard could not be met through a “fear of future 
disturbances.”269  The court found no evidence of fear of future distur-
bances because of Justin’s immediate suspension and the fact that school 
was shut down for the holiday.270  In addition, the court noted that the 
MySpace related sites had been successfully blocked from student 
access.271  Due to the dearth in evidence of a substantial disruption or a fear 
of future disturbances, the court held that the “[s]chool’s right to maintain 
 
 260. 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007). 
 261. See id. at 591. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id.  In response to the question, “in the past month have you smoked?” the profile 
says a “big blunt.” Id.  In response to a question regarding alcohol use, the profile states “big 
keg behind my desk.” Id.  The profile also states that the principal is “too drunk to remem-
ber” the date of his birthday and that the principal is a “big steroid freak.” Id. 
 264. See id. 
 265. Id. at 593. 
 266. Id. at 598 (“It is clear that the test for school authority is not geographical.”). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id.  While the court found that under Fraser, lewd, sexually provocative student 
speech may be banned without the need to prove that it would cause a substantial disruption 
to the school learning environment, the court concluded that Fraser applied only to on cam-
pus speech. See id. at 599. 
 269. Id. at 601. 
 270. See id. 
 271. See id. 
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an environment conducive to learning does not trump Justin’s First 
Amendment right to freedom of expression.”272 
The most recent case finding that no reasonable fact finder could con-
clude that the speech was reasonably likely to cause substantial disruption 
is J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District.273  In this case, a student 
posted a video on YouTube274 from her home computer.275  The video dis-
played a group of students at a local restaurant making fun of another stu-
dent.276  In utilizing the risk of substantial disruption to the school standard, 
the court focused on whether there was any evidence of a history of disrup-
tive verbal or physical altercations between the students involved in the 
video, or of similar student speech causing any type of disruption to the 
school environment.277  The court found that the lack of evidence of a prior 
relationship between the students involved in the video did not support a 
prediction that a verbal or physical confrontation was likely to occur, and 
therefore rejected the school district’s argument that there was a reasonable 
fear of disruption.278  In addition, the court stated that “[e]ven in the ab-
sence of specific evidence about these particular students, Defendants 
could have supported their fear of a future substantial disruption with evi-
dence that student speech similar to the YouTube video had resulted in vi-
olence or near violence at Beverly Vista in the past.”279  Because the record 
was silent in this regard, the court held that there was insufficient evidence 
to support the school’s decision to discipline the student.280 
III.  PROPOSED REFINEMENT 
The current ad hoc approach to determining whether a school district can 
reasonably forecast substantial disruption to the school environment has re-
sulted in unpredictable, and therefore unfair, decisions.  Because social 
networking sites enable students to have wide access to information instan-
taneously, it will always be reasonably foreseeable that online student 
speech will affect the school. 
 
 272. Id. 
 273. 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 274. YouTube is a video sharing website on which users can upload and share videos. 
See YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/about_youtube (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
 275. See J.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1098. 
 276. Id.  The student called the other student a “slut.” Id.  The video also contains profan-
ity. Id. 
 277. See id. at 1116. 
 278. See id. at 1120. 
 279. Id. 
 280. See id. at 1121. 
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Judge Chagares, in his concurring opinion in Snyder, stated that “courts 
need to define ‘foreseeability’ in a way that is harmonious with Tinker.”281  
In The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, Kristi L. Bowman 
describes how the substantial disruption test was created to give greater 
protection to the student’s freedom of speech right.282  Therefore, the pur-
pose behind leaving the standard broad was to allow for flexibility to avoid 
a chilling effect on a student’s First Amendment right to free speech.283  
Nevertheless, such flexibility or vagueness has in practice had the opposite 
effect.284  This chilling effect likely stems from the courts’ recognition of 
the school districts’ need to maintain order.  A malleable interpretation of 
the term “reasonable” has allowed schools to meet this need by permitting 
them to act in advance of actual disruption and not requiring them to wait 
and see whether the speech produces the disruptive effect.285  Therefore, I 
am proposing a higher standard for student speech cases that will better fil-
ter the protected speech from speech that should not be protected because it 
presents a reasonable risk of substantial disruption to the school environ-
ment. 
To determine whether a forecast of substantial disruption is reasonable, a 
court should consider whether the likelihood of disruption is high and the 
type of disruption is one that poses great harm to the school environment.  
This proposed test is based on Chief Judge Learned Hand’s formula, set 
forth in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.286  In Carroll Towing, an im-
properly secured barge drifted away from a pier and caused damage to oth-
er boats.287  According to the Hand formula, an act is in breach of the duty 
of care if the burden of taking precautions is less than the probability of the 
loss, multiplied by the gravity of the loss.288 
The Hand formula was applied to a First Amendment issue in Dennis v. 
United States,289 a case in which defendants were convicted for conspiring 
to organize the Communist party to teach and advocate the overthrow of 
 
 281. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 316 (3d Cir. 2010) (Chagares, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“[C]ourts must determine when an undifferentiated 
fear or apprehension of disturbance transforms into a reasonable forecast that a substantial 
disruption or material interference will occur.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), reh’g en 
banc granted No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. June 3, 2010). 
 282. 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1129, 1163 (2009). 
 283. See id. at 1159-60. 
 284. See id. at 1162 (arguing that the vagueness of Tinker has resulted in unfair deci-
sions). 
 285. See id. at 1163. 
 286. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 287. See id. at 170-71. 
 288. Id. at 173. 
 289. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
LEVIN_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:19 PM 
2011] SCHOOL DISTRICTS AS WEATHERMEN 891 
the United States government by force and violence, in violation of Section 
3 of the Smith Act.290  When Dennis was decided, case law allowed the 
government to prohibit speech that presented a “clear and present danger” 
that a substantial public evil would result from such speech.291  Therefore, 
the question in Dennis was whether speech inciting the Communist Party to 
teach and advocate the overthrow of the United States government by force 
and violence presented a clear and present danger, thus allowing the gov-
ernment to prohibit such speech through legislation.292  In determining 
whether such speech presented a clear and present danger in Dennis, the 
Court quoted Chief Judge Hand’s opinion, stating that the standard is 
whether “the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies 
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”293  The 
Dennis Court stated that “[i]f the ingredients of the reaction are present, we 
cannot bind the Government to wait until the catalyst is added.”294 
While the foreseeable harm resulting from an overthrown government is 
certainly more severe than disruption to the school environment, Judge 
Hand’s test is nevertheless applicable to the school context.  In Dennis, the 
concern was about the result of speech inciting people to overthrow the 
government.295  In the school context, there is a parallel fear that disallow-
ing school officials from prohibiting certain speech will result in a substan-
tial disruption to the school environment.  Therefore, the Hand formula can 
be used to determine whether the evidence supports a finding of a reasona-
ble forecast of substantial disruption to the school environment. 
Under the proposed standard, if the likelihood of disruption is low and 
the type of disruption is one that poses de minimis harm to the school, then 
the forecast of substantial disruption is not reasonable.  Conversely, if the 
type of disruption poses great harm and the likelihood of disruption is high, 
the forecast of a substantial disruption is reasonable.  In situations where 
the type of disruption poses little harm, even if there is a significant likelih-
ood of such harm occurring, the harm does not rise to the level of substan-
tial disruption which would allow a school to limit a student’s First 
 
 290. See 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2006). 
 291. See Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“When a nation is at war many 
things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utter-
ance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as pro-
tected by any constitutional right.”). 
 292. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 497, 505, 508. 
 293. Id. at 510 (rejecting the contention that before the government may prohibit such 
speech, it must wait until the plan to overthrow the government is about to be executed). 
 294. Id. at 511. 
 295. See id. at 508-09 (stating that the purpose of the prohibiting statute was to protect 
the government from change by violence, revolution, and terrorism). 
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Amendment right to free speech.  For the cases that are too close to call, 
courts should always err on the side of protecting free speech in order to 
avoid any chilling effect on a student’s First Amendment right. 
The difficult question arises when the type of harm is great but the like-
lihood of disruption is low, as in the case of a student posting a comment 
on his Facebook profile that he is going to kill everyone in the school.  
While death certainly poses great harm, the probability that a student will 
kill everyone in the school is very low.296  Under the standard I am propos-
ing, the forecast of substantial disruption would not be reasonable in this 
situation.  While it is arguable that this outrageous speech about a massive 
school shooting should be prohibited, especially in the wake of other 
school shootings, there must be a judicial check on the school’s ability to 
infringe a student’s First Amendment right, and my proposed standard 
helps ensure there is no chilling effect on this right. 
Cases concerning a student-created parody profile of a school adminis-
trator will almost always fall under the low risk of substantial disruption 
and de minimis harm category.  While speech made over the Internet “can 
reach the entire student population at any time, in school, or out of school, 
which can lead to a quickly developing widespread disruption,”297 the 
unique characteristics of the Internet, combined with the school’s interest in 
maintaining order, do not give the school district a blank check to prohibit 
speech otherwise protected under the First Amendment.  First, the underly-
ing purpose of the First Amendment is to allow uninhibited commentary on 
the powers that be, including embarrassing information.298  Therefore, Lay-
shock’s embarrassing comment about his principal, for example, is exactly 
the type of speech that the First Amendment is intended to protect.  Second, 
a threat to the school’s interest in maintaining a safe and encouraging learn-
ing environment is nonexistent when the likelihood that the speech will 
reach the school is low and the type of speech does not pose great harm to 
 
 296. See Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 309 (3d Cir. 2010) (Cha-
gares, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that the profile’s content was so ridi-
culous that no one could take it seriously and no one did), reh’g en banc granted No. 08-
4138 (3d Cir. June 3, 2010).  The odds that a child would die in school by homicide are no 
greater than one in one million. Marisa Reddy et al., Evaluating Risk for Targeted Violence 
in Schools: Comparing Risk Assessment, Threat Assessment, and Other Approaches, 38(2) 
PSYCHOL. SCH. 157, 159 (2001), available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/ntac_threat_ 
postpress.pdf. 
 297. Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering With Students’ Rights: The Need for an En-
hanced First Amendment Standard to Protect Off-Campus Student Internet Speech, 36 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 129, 152 (2007). 
 298. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) (“The dominant 
purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental 
suppression of embarrassing information.”). 
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the school.  With respect to parody profiles where the speech is likely a ju-
venile attempt at humor, the disruption likely to occur is a school official 
simply feeling embarrassed and angered.  A school official does not have 
the right to prohibit speech simply because the speech embarrasses him.  
Therefore, the proposed standard raises the bar on the school’s ability to 
reasonably forecast substantial disruption by allowing a finding of reasona-
bleness only when the likelihood of disruption is high and the type of dis-
ruption is great, a point at which the school’s interest is at its zenith.  This 
higher standard will ensure that school officials are not overstepping their 
bounds in prohibiting speech protected by the First Amendment. 
To better understand the appropriateness of the proposed standard, we 
must carefully balance the school’s need to maintain an environment con-
ducive to learning and the student’s right to free speech.  The proper exer-
cise of the First Amendment has been characterized as the “hallmark of ci-
tizenship in [this] country.”299  Because the classroom prepares students for 
responsibility, civility, and maturity,300 it should ideally embody the free 
speech rights of citizenship.  According to constitutional scholar Erwin 
Chemerinsky, protection of student expression should not be viewed as be-
ing “in tension with the mission of schools,” but rather as a “crucial part of 
educating students about the Constitution.”301  Chemerinsky notes that, in 
Tinker, Justice Fortas quoted an earlier opinion of Justice Brennan, which 
stressed that freedom of speech is especially important in schools: “The vi-
gilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in 
the community of American schools.  The classroom is peculiarly the 
‘marketplace of ideas.’”302 
Nonetheless, public schools are not traditional public fora.303  A school 
has the unique duty to maintain control and protect students in the school 
environment.304  The Court in Tinker found the school’s interest in preserv-
ing order so important that, by itself, it was enough to outweigh the stu-
dent’s speech rights.305  Unfortunately, given the history of school shoot-
 
 299. Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 300. See Lisa M. Pisciotta, Beyond Sticks & Stones: A First Amendment Framework for 
Educators who Seek to Punish Student Threats, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 635, 669 (2000) 
(“As courts attempt to draw this line in the context of student threats, they must remember 
that students are still learning and consequently need to grow into their constitutional 
rights.”). 
 301. Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the 
Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 532 (2000) (describing 
inconsistent lower court opinions in the area of student free speech). 
 302. Id. at 531-32. 
 303. See Chandler, 978 F.2d at 527. 
 304. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). 
 305. See Markey, supra note 297, at 135. 
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ings, there is a reasonable possibility of such shootings occurring again and 
the school needs to be able to prevent such harm before it is too late.  Some 
observers have gone so far as to argue that after the school shootings in Co-
lumbine, Colorado, the threat of violence is so great that the need to pre-
serve order has increased since Tinker.306  “Web sites can be an early indi-
cation of a student’s violent inclinations” and provide a medium for 
spreading beliefs “quickly to like-minded or susceptible people.”307  Never-
theless, as Judge Fisher noted in LaVine, “[j]ust as the Constitution does 
not allow the police to imprison all suspicious characters, schools cannot 
expel students just because they are ‘loners,’ [who] wear black and play 
video games.”308  Therefore, it is not appropriate to find a reasonable fore-
cast of substantial disruption if the type of harm poses a great risk but the 
likelihood of such harm is low. 
Courts are the only check on schools violating students’ First Amend-
ment right to free speech.  If the proposed test is not adopted by courts, 
schools will be left unchecked in prohibiting speech with which they simp-
ly disagree, but which does not present a reasonably foreseeable risk of 
substantial disruption. 
For example, in Snyder, a student created a parody profile of the princip-
al that included fictitious information about the principal’s sexuality and 
illegal conduct.309  This is a prime example of a school prohibiting speech 
that it simply disliked.  Nonetheless, the Third Circuit, utilizing the forecast 
of substantial disruption standard, found that the school did not violate the 
First Amendment by suspending the student for such speech.310  Under the 
proposed standard, such speech would be properly protected.  The type of 
disruption that would occur from such a parody profile is the principal’s 
embarrassment, which is not a great harm.  While it is arguable that the 
principal would lose the respect of students and, therefore, be unable to 
maintain order within the school, the likelihood of such a disruption is low 
because a reasonable student would not find such outrageous information 
to be true.  Therefore, under the proposed standard, the school unreasona-
bly forecasted substantial disruption in Snyder. 
 
 306. See generally Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censor-
ship of the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243 (2001) (arguing 
that fears about Internet technology and Columbine-like violence are suppressing off cam-
pus student expression). 
 307. Emmett v. Kent, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
 308. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 309. See supra notes 211-233 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra notes 211233 and accompanying text. 
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An additional example of the proposed test allowing for the appropriate 
outcome is Doninger.311  In that case, the type of disruption posed great 
harm to the school environment because inciting others to write or call a 
school official diverts the school administrators from their core educational 
responsibilities, which in turn inhibits their ability to maintain order in the 
school.  The likelihood that such disruption would occur was high because 
the act of calling or writing a school official is not illegal (unlike killing a 
school official), the speech was made over the Internet (which allows for 
many people to view the speech in a short period of time), and numerous 
people did in fact call the school officials.  Therefore, under the proposed 
test, the school district reasonably forecasted a substantial disruption to the 
school environment. 
Many courts have addressed the issue of whether punishment for online 
speech should be reserved to the parents of the student.312  The court in 
Thomas discussed how the “custody, care and nurture” of the child reside 
first in the parents.313  Still, courts have rejected this argument because 
schools maintain authority over their students acting in loco parentis.314  
During school hours, children are in the compulsory custody of the state-
operated school system where the state’s power is “custodial and tutelary, 
permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised 
over free adults.”315  In Snyder, the court further noted that courts have held 
that in certain circumstances, “the parental right to control the upbringing 
of a child must give way to a school’s ability to control curriculum and the 
school environment.”316  The proposed standard only allows for school dis-
cipline in circumstances where the school’s ability to control the curricu-
lum and school environment trumps a student’s free speech right. 
It is important to note that while a school has another course of action, 
namely, initiating a libel lawsuit, such a suit is not the appropriate form of 
recovery for student speech cases.  Libel covers only a small percentage of 
the cases concerning student speech.  In addition, exaggerated false state-
ments may not always be considered assertions of fact that can be “objec-
 
 311. See supra notes 188-210 and accompanying text. 
 312. See, e.g., Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 304 (3d Cir. 2010), 
reh’g en banc granted No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. June 3, 2010); Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 
F.2d 1043, 1053 n.18 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 313. Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1053 n.18. 
 314. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 304. 
 315. Id. (quoting Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 304 (3d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 316. Id. 
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tively verified” in a court of law.317  For example, the cases concerning pa-
rody profiles are narrow where it is clearly a juvenile humor attempt.318  
Therefore, cases concerning a parody profile of a school official are not ap-
propriate libel cases. 
In applying the proposed refinement of the forecast of substantial disrup-
tion standard established in Tinker, courts must conduct a de novo review.  
It is far too easy for a school district to claim that the likelihood and type of 
disruption to the school environment are high when in fact the school might 
have disciplined a student because of “a mere desire to avoid the discom-
fort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular view-
point.”319  In addition, the school official’s grand claim of likely substantial 
disruption will occur too frequently, ruling out any reasonable argument for 
deference to the school official.  In addition, school officials are in a posi-
tion of power over the students.  They have the unique ability to punish a 
person who expresses a criticism of the school board that might be embar-
rassing and upsetting.  De novo review of the likelihood and type of disrup-
tion will ensure that school officials do not smuggle dislike of the content 
of the speech under the guise of a “fear of disruption.”  Under a de novo re-
view, the court must consider the circumstances and “need not choose be-
tween dueling sets of self-serving statements regarding the existence of dis-
ruption.”320 
CONCLUSION 
Since Tinker, student speech has been a hotly debated issue.  On one 
side of the issue are students who have the right to express themselves free-
ly in a democratic society.  On the other side are school officials who need 
to maintain order in the schools and an environment conducive to learning.  
The result is disjointed jurisprudence in the lower courts where judges are 
left with the task of balancing these competing important interests in an ef-
fort to combat any chilling effect on First Amendment rights. 
Today, with the advent of the Internet and social networking sites, tack-
ling the issue of student speech has become even more difficult.  Student 
speech is no longer limited to underground newspapers or graffiti on the 
 
 317. Kathleen Conn, Cyberbullying and Other Student Misuses of Technology Affecting 
K-12 Public Schools: Will Public School Administrators be Held Responsible for the Con-
sequences?, 244 W. EDUC. L. REP. 479, 484 (2009) (citing Draker v. Schrieber, 271 S.W.3d 
318, 321 (Tex. App. 2008)). 
 318. See, e.g., Snyder, 593 F.3d at 316 (Chagares, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part) (stating that profile’s content was so ridiculous that no one could take it seriously). 
 319. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
 320. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 593 (6th Cir. 2007). 
LEVIN_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:19 PM 
2011] SCHOOL DISTRICTS AS WEATHERMEN 897 
bathroom wall.  Students are now able to broadcast their criticisms of the 
school establishment in a widely publicized forum.  While this speech may 
not necessarily take place on school grounds, its effect can very well have a 
substantial effect on the school campus.  Applying the Tinker standard, it 
seems clear that schools can regulate student Internet speech that poses a 
reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the school environ-
ment. 
Nonetheless, it is imperative that the judiciary fulfills its duty to act as a 
check on the schools.  Courts must ensure that schools are not punishing 
students simply because the school disagrees with or dislikes the student 
speech, absent a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption to the school 
setting.  Therefore, courts should adopt the proposed test, which allows a 
school to punish speech only if the likelihood of disruption is high and the 
type of disruption is one that poses great harm to the school environment.  
If courts do not adopt this standard, they will be allowing schools to im-
pede on a student’s First Amendment right, a right that ensures the free 
flow of information and dissemination of ideas.  Education is a fundamen-
tal aspect of our society and school discipline is essential to providing an 
effective education.321  Nonetheless, the protection of a student’s right to 
free speech is particularly important during such an influential time in order 
to foster society’s interest in the free flow of information. 
 
 321. See O’Connor, supra note 63, at 484. 
